North Dakota Law Review
Volume 38

Number 3

Article 11

1962

Automobiles - Family Purpose Doctrine - Limitation on Application
in North Dakota
David Landberg

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Landberg, David (1962) "Automobiles - Family Purpose Doctrine - Limitation on Application in North
Dakota," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 38 : No. 3 , Article 11.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol38/iss3/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

RECENT CASES
"Write an opinion, and read it a few years later when it is
dissected in the briefs of counsel. You will learn for the first
time the limitations of the power of speech, or, if not those of
speech in general, at all events your own."
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Law and Literature 8

AUTOMOBILES FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE ON APPLICATION IN NORTH DAKOTA-Plaintiff

LIMITATION

brought this

action to recover for damage to his automobile which, while
driven by his minor son, was involved in an intersection collision with the defendant. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff was estopped from recovering on the grounds that under
the family purpose doctrine the son's contributory negligence
was imputed to the father. In affirming a judgment for the
plaintiff, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that any negligence of the owner's minor son was not imputable to the
owner under the family purpose doctrine. Michaelsohn v.
Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1962).
The family purpose doctrine is founded on an extension of
the law of agency,1 but in reality rests on considerations of
public policy by providing financial responsibility for negligent acts of the family members. 2 The doctrine is of comparatively late origin, 3 and although it could be applied with equal
logic to any item furnished for the use of the family, it has
4
been primarily confined to automobiles.
Over one-half of the states have repudiated the family purpose doctrine.5 Various reasons given for its repudiation in1.

Lynn v. Clark, 252 N.C. 289, 113 S.E.2d 427 (1960); Norwood v. Porth-

emos, 230 S.C. 207, 95 S.E.2d 168

(1956).

2. In Turner v. Hall's Adm'x, 252 S.W.2d 30 (K{y. 1952), the court stated
that, "the Family Purpose Doctrine is a humanitarian one designed for
the protection of the public generally, and resulted from recognition of
the fact that in the vast majority of the instances an infant has not sufficient property In his own right to indemnify one who may suffer from his
negligent act." See also Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn.
394, 10 N.W.2d 406, 417 (1943).
3.
Dailey v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S.W. 351 (1911) was one

of the first cases to apply the Family Purpose Doctrine.
4. See Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W. 37 (1932), where the
court refused to apply the doctrine to motorboats. But see Meinhardt v.
Vaughn, 15 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929), where the court refused to apply
the doctrine to motorcycles; Pflugmacher v. Thomas, 209 P.2d 443 (Wash.
1949) where it was held not to apply to bicycles.
5. See, e.g., Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 60 So. 150 (1912); Spence v.
Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 193 Pac. 255 (1920); Smith v. Callahan, 144 Atl. 46, (Del.
1928); Anderson v. Byrnes, 344 Ill. 240, 176 N.E. 374 (1931); White v. Seitz,
342 Ill. 266, 174 N.E. 371 (1930).
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clude the idea that the practical administration of justice between the parties is more important than preserving some
secret theory concerning the law of agency; 6 that it is a fictional agency based on unsound legal theory;7 that it is contrary to common sense to say that when a member of a family
uses the family car for his own pleasure he is accomplishing
his father's business;" and that there is a need for a stricter
application of the laws of agency because the doctrine has no
firm foundation in reason or common sense.9
The leading case in support of the family purpose doctrine
in North Dakota is Ulman v. Lindeman,'° wherein the court
said, "In our opinion the legal reasons are sound which justify
the imposition of a liability upon the owner of an automobile
where injury through negligence occurs by means of an instrumentality used for his business or the pleasure of himself or
family, through methods or agencies that he has provided or
authorized." North Dakota has limited the scope of the doctrine, in that the car must have been used for the purpose for
which the parent provided it, with authority expressed or implied. 1' A second limitation is that the negligent member of
the family has to be a member of the household to which the
1
car was furnished. '
The instant case also restricts the doctrine when it is shown
that the defendant is guilty of contributory negligence. The
damages for the injuries to the family member who was operating the automobile will be barred by his own contributory
negligence. However, the son's contributory negligence will
not bar the plaintiff's action for the damages to his automobile. It is submitted that such a limitation places the family
purpose doctrine within its proper perspective, that of providing financial responsibility for members of the family. Where
financial responsibility is absent from the case, an application
of the family purpose doctrine defeats the public policy the
doctrine is intended to serve.
DAVID LANDBERG
6. King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918). See also Durzo
v. Cazzolino, 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1941).
7. See Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W.2d 63 (1935).
8. Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131 (1918).
9. Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1, 200 S.W. 286 (1917).
10. 44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25 (1919).
11. Carpenter v. Dunnell, 61 N.D. 263, 237 N.W. 779 (1931).
12. Bryan v. Schatz, 39 N.W.2d 435 (N.D. 1949).

